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It is an honour to receive commentaries on Economy of Force from these four 
distinguished scholars. I am grateful to Tarak Barkawi, Patchen Markell, Julian Go, and 
Vivienne Jabri for devoting precious scholarly time to this book.  
Economy of Force is not about the ‘economics of war’, or not in any 
straightforward sense. Rather it retrieves the older, but surprisingly neglected, history and 
theory of oikonomia, ancient Greek for household governance. The book is a study of 
oikonomia in the use of military force, but also as underlying distinctly social forms of 
governance more broadly. There is a very long tradition of thinking about households-as-
government and a great deal of scholarship in literary and gender studies on practices and 
ideologies of domesticity. Oikonomia is the origin of the language of modern 
‘economics’, but more importantly and revealingly almost all writing about government 
in the West. International and much political theory is out of touch with these literatures 
resulting in blindness to a crucial reality about modern governance forms. The large-scale 
household administration of life processes plays a remarkably central role in international 
and imperial relations. Economy of Force illustrates this through a history of so-called 
‘armed social work’ in counterinsurgency, beginning with late-nineteenth-century French 
and American colonial pacification and then detailed case studies of two late-colonial 
British emergencies in Malaya and Kenya, US counterinsurgency in Vietnam, and US-led 
multinational campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. In each case, to varying degrees and in 
different ways, the civilian base of armed resistance was weakened through the forcible 
removal and mass concentration of civilians; the selective delivery and withholding of 
humanitarian supplies; the empowering of local collaborators to rule ‘their population’; 
detention without trial and exemplary massacres; and the opening of markets and new 
schools. If insurgents and counterinsurgents are in a competition in government, then 
what is the nature of government under counterinsurgency rule? Through violence and 
control over life, through the management of gendered and racialised bodies in their 
extreme and irreducible vulnerability, counterinsurgents were seeking to create units of 
rule in which populations could be domesticated. That is, they drew on and innovated 
different forms of household management. 
Patchen Markell has written an elegant and generous essay on Economy of Force. 
Among the many insightful observations, perhaps the most challenging is his recounting 
of the complex history, ambiguities, and political stakes in the concept of homology. 
Initially drawn to talk of a ‘domestic homology’ for rhetorical reasons - to emphasise the 
far deeper significance of domesticity and households to an international theory audience 
over-familiar with, even jaded by, ‘domestic analogies’ - the expression actually pointed 
to a more profound insight. The rise of the modern social realm from the late eighteenth-
century did not displace household rule; it was itself a form of this oldest art and science 
                                                     
1 I am extremely grateful to past and present editors of Security Dialogue, Claudia Aradau, Maria Stern and 
Mark B. Salter, for overseeing this special section, as well as three anonymous reviewers for their insightful 
comments on earlier drafts. 
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of government. Modern government administration - local, national, imperial - was not 
merely analogous to ‘social housekeeping’. To the extent that populations in modern 
society continued to be governed through the administration of life processes, it was 
actually a form of household rule. In general agreement with the central claims and intent 
of the book, Markell nonetheless raises a vital question about the basis of the claimed 
homology between household forms. Returning to the original mid-nineteenth century 
debate in biology, he suggests two possibilities. Either the likeness is ‘archetypal’ in 
which the essential traits of household management are extrapolated from one particular 
instance; later household forms would then be said to either fit or diverge from the 
archetype. Or the likeness could be genealogical, with the task to trace the lines of 
historical and theoretical descent from earlier household forms to the modern social realm, 
and practices of counterinsurgency, without necessarily needing to claim that modern 
society itself is a household.  
I am grateful for this prompt to more clearly articulate the basis of the claimed 
homology, which is neither archetypal nor only genealogical. Clearly much so-called 
Western ‘political’ language and thought descends from ancient thinking about the oikos, 
but also domus (Latin for house), that is, domestication and de-politicization. As Markell 
writes, there are important continuities ‘in discourses about households, ways of 
representing the nature of household life and making it meaningful whose transmission 
across time and space can be charted’. As Vivienne Jabri also notes, ‘the governmental 
state… draw[s] upon a discursive and institutional legacy that stemmed in various forms 
of household’; liberalism’s ‘imperative to “domesticate”’ derives ‘from understandings of 
household management’; there are actions ‘that render household as a category of 
practice’; and powerful actors use ‘the language of the domestic realm as a mode of 
legitimation’. However, the ancient Greek oikos itself, of course, is not the progenitor of 
actual, really existing modern forms of household. To say that ‘armed social work’ is a 
form of oikonomia in the use of force is not to say that the oikos is an unrecognised 
ancestor of modern forms of social regulation for there is no archetypal household. 
Rather it is to retrieve a powerful framework to convey the historical persistence of 
governance based on the ministration of life processes. This is the homological bond 
connecting practices that are so historically variable: the human experience of biological 
necessity and stubborn, contingent, but never wholly successful attempts to domesticate 
people through the administration and control of life necessities.  
This central basis of household governance is missing from Tarak Barkawi’s 
typically incisive reading, which allows me to clarify an important distinction not stated 
clearly enough in the book. Given the pervasiveness of modern liberalism and social 
theories, all of which are based on the premise of the destruction of large-scale forms of 
household governance, there was a need to uncover the earlier history of households and 
its continuing legacy in seemingly post-household (that is, social) thought. This accounts 
for the book’s extensive discussion of genealogies of household governance in the history 
of thought. Barkawi interprets this as the basis of the ontological claim that the modern 
social realm is a scaled-up and transformed household, thus reducing Economy of Force 
to analyses of ‘texts’ and discourse. This would indeed be a powerful criticism if the 
claim regarding the continuing reality of household governance rested on a genealogy of 
thought. But instead it rests on a demonstration of the persistence of the hierarchical 
administration of life processes in modern capitalist and imperial society through 
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historical analysis of capitalism, imperialism, states, and social policy. To be sure, as 
Markell notes, while sociocratic government can be traced back to earlier household 
forms, this does not necessarily signify that the household form itself is continuous. This 
is where Markell sits, aligning this position with Hannah Arendt.2 Anything more, he 
suggests, risks diminishing ‘the nature and extent of the transformations in household 
rule that are involved in the modern “rise of the social”’, the intermediary between 
capitalism and state power. However, there are good grounds for claiming that this is 
exactly what persists - ontologically - not just genealogically: units of rule in which 
populations are domesticated through administering life necessities. For if there is no 
claim to an archetypal homology, then the dangers of underestimating the degree of 
transformations in household rule in modern society are diminished. The question is 
whether the historical account is convincing; whether I have successfully marked the 
distinctive traits of the modern social realm while also demonstrating the continuities 
with older household forms; whether I can show that modern capitalist, imperial society 
failed to liberate the management of life processes from household despotism.  
As continually demonstrated in fields outside IR, to do something other than 
historical sociology is not to forgo historical research. Hence, Barkawi is hopefully right 
that there is nothing in Economy of Force ‘that looks like a historical sociology of 
household rule or warfare’ (emphasis added). That was deliberate; the book is a 
theoretically informed history that eschews casual and ahistorical references to ‘social 
processes’, ‘social structures’, ‘social forces’, and so on. This necessitated drawing on a 
wide range of approaches and fields, as well as writing in quite different registers 
combining histories and critiques of social and political thought and large-scale historical 
analysis of some of the major institutions of modernity with empirical analyses of 
counterinsurgency campaigns and accompanying texts. While each of them in different 
ways and for different reasons obscured modern household governance, the broader 
writings of ‘social’ thinkers such Marx, Weber, Habermas and others were obviously not 
off-limits in this task, nor were works by later social scientists. How could they be? 
Economy of Force is a study of one key feature of modernity, which is necessarily related 
to but does not seek to subvert Marx on capitalism or Weber on bureaucracy. But these 
thinkers were not sufficient on their own. The book drew equally, if not more, from 
humanities scholarship, especially history, literary, feminist, gender and postcolonial 
studies. The point was not, as Barkawi fears, to supplant one totalising project with 
another. In contrast, Markell saw a ‘re-narration’, a ‘recasting’ of the rise of states, 
capitalism, and empires in a large-scale but not totalising history and theory of 
households. 
Similarly, the grounds for conceiving counterinsurgency practices as oikonomia in 
the use of force are far wider than Barkawi suggests, in a ‘hidden discourse of household 
politics [sic] in the texts of social theorists and counterinsurgents’. They are in 
longstanding and well-documented historical practices of administering local populations 
in these wars, the forcible removal and concentration; food denial and control of 
humanitarian supplies; funding and arming of local despots, deaths squads and militia; 
                                                     
2 This is ambiguous. Though Economy of Force does not depend on the precise nature of Arendt’s claim, 
she came very close saying that society is more than just analogous to a household, writing of ‘the reality of 
a national household’ and ‘the rise of society’ as ‘the rise of the “household” (oikia) or of economic 
activities to the public realm’ (1958: 33, 44).  
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highly gendered and racialised attempts at liberal improvement; house raids, torture, and 
mass detentions. But how does rereading such practices as household administration 
‘challenge other scholarship’ on counterinsurgency (Barkawi)? As discussed at length in 
the Introduction, albeit not in the case studies, the three currently dominant theories of 
counterinsurgency rule are unconvincing in the light of the historical rise of the social 
realm (21-39). Political realism does not provide a convincing analysis of the nature of 
counterinsurgency, but repeats the stated objectives of counterinsurgency states because 
it is itself a historically specific paradigm of social regulation (25-27, 69-76). Liberal 
solidarism and structural functionalism obscure the way counterinsurgencies are actually 
fought and how, if at all, victory is achieved. They too are best situated within the violent 
transformation of the social realm (27-32, 76-84). Followers of Foucault rightly 
emphasize, rather than obscure, the coercive character of armed social work (32-37). 
However, an essential part of Foucault’s own story about the ‘discovery of population’ 
rests on a false premise, specifically his characterization of the underlying model that was 
supposedly (but had not) been eliminated: households (69-84, 109-11).  
Counterinsurgency practitioners interpreted and justified what they were doing as 
a form of sociological warfare. They also repeatedly turned to social theory to explain the 
causes of revolts. The purpose of analysing such accounts, which were variously rooted 
in political realism, liberal solidarism, constructivism, and structural functionalism, was 
certainly not because they determined the conduct of actual wars. It was not any social 
theory that shaped the kind and degree of pacification across each case, but the 
exigencies of war itself and the logics of household governance. Thus the book does not 
claim that military commanders based ‘their campaigns upon social thought’, which 
leading sociologist Julian Go suggests is ‘the most fundamental claim in the book’. It 
repeatedly states the opposite (24-5, 43, 248).  Barkawi’s example of ‘slippage’ between 
genealogy and ontology is not a counterinsurgency case, but a brief account of the 1857 
Sepoy Revolt (i.e. there was no attempt to present it as an historical event). Taken out of 
context, a literal reading of one line does give the false impression that utilitarian ideas 
caused the revolt. However, read in context this was clearly a charge made by 
conservative critics of utilitarianism, not me. So why analyze accompanying social 
theories if they had so little effect on counterinsurgency conduct? It was to highlight their 
common place in the history of oikonomia. The claim does not require specific social 
theories to have an independent impact on military campaigns let alone actual 
sociologists directing military strategy, the smoking gun that Go demands in a spirited 
defence of his field. Indeed, it was French army officer David Galula, the most influential 
propagandist of ‘armed social work’, who referred to pacification as ‘the conduct of 
sociological warfare’. This was not because its practitioners were sociology graduates. 
Rather he rightly perceived pacification war and sociology as primarily concerned with 
the administration of insurgent populations. This is not a functionalist argument, as Go 
suggests to illustrate, tautologically, the impossibility of escaping ‘social’ explanation. 
The social realm did not emerge in the eighteenth-century ‘to serve the needs of elites 
repressing revolt’ (Go). Its emergence as the intermediary between capitalism and 
imperial state power provided new means of pacification. By the nineteenth-century 
social forms of regulation expanded in response to the revolutionary effects of industrial, 
democratic, and anti-colonial revolts. As Markell’s reading of homology suggests, 
particular hierarchical relations between people based on experiences of bodily and other 
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necessities may have a deep-rooted likeness that we may name, historicise and theorise 
without resorting to sociological functionalism. 
Economy of Force could and perhaps should have said more on the relationship 
between ideology and counterinsurgency practice. But it is only by tautology and 
definitional fiat that this would constitute ‘social’ explanation, as Barkawi suggests. 
However, I am surely responsible for not explicitly stating that it was only a rumor that 
the British in India greased cartridges with the fat of beef and pork, thus perpetuating an 
Orientalist stereotype. But, again, that rumors have effects and dynamics, including 
stigmatization, was understood centuries before they were repackaged as ‘social’ 
concepts. Nonetheless, the stereotype was a mistake, and a troubling one given the 
significant danger, well highlighted by Julian Go, of downplaying subaltern agency by 
focusing primarily on counterinsurgency. Without doubt, this was the most challenging 
dilemma of writing a book of this kind. The not wholly satisfactory solution was to 
include examples of local resistance across each of the cases and repeatedly emphasise, 
demonstrating as far as possible, the conceptual claim that household governance is 
always co-constituted by resistance to it. More generally, given everything else on 
colonial and other revolts, it is difficult to sustain the claim that the book ‘says nothing 
about the agency of insurgents themselves’ (Go) or that the causes of revolts are reduced 
to a ‘theoretic system’ (Barkawi). On the contrary, as explicitly stated, ‘It did not require 
any social theory for workers to observe and understand the clear gap between the 
founding ideals of the democratic revolutions… and the realities of industrial life. 
Similarly, no social explanation for the Indian Rebellion was needed to explain the 
collective decision of a group of Sepoys to “mutiny”’ (67).  
The Committee to Enquire into the Sociological Causes and Remedies for Mau 
Mau did not need a sociology PhD because the beginnings, significance, and utility of 
distinctly social modes of thought precede and exceed sociology as the scientific ‘study 
of society’. The modern concepts of economy, culture, civil society, psychology, the 
social, and the political emerged out of a new set of ideological distinctions and practices 
attendant the modern rise of the social realm itself. Unsurprisingly, this is replicated in 
counterinsurgency practices and texts. In the total ‘social revolutions’ they violently 
enacted, counterinsurgents did not fetishize practical fields or disciplinary distinctions, 
which is why social anthropologists, social psychologists, and economists all played a 
legitimating role. The book focuses more on sociology due to its privileged position as 
keeper of the canon of classical social thought and because few in international theory 
question the validity or historicity of social and sociological theory; there are only 
debates about its different forms (Owens, 2015b). Go rightly points to the plurality of 
social theory in IR. Economy of Force does not ignore that. Rather it shows that in spite 
of its diversity social theory has obscured the household ontology of the modern social 
realm and is unable to properly theorise politics. It is therefore surprising that Go claims 
the book is ‘not really about social theory’, but only one of its forms, that every reference 
to ‘social theories’ should be replaced with ‘structural functionalist social theory’ (Go). 
There is lengthy analysis of the earliest philosophies of sociability; enlightenment 
theorists of bourgeois civil society; Lockean ‘societal’ and nineteenth-century ‘social’ 
liberalism; political realism, Marxism, structural functionalism, and sociological readings 
of Foucault. These diverse theories are not all tarred with the same brush; each is 
subjected to its own singular critique and historicization.  
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The social sciences are increasingly comfortable with the effort to provincialize 
social thought. However, to date, there has been greater resistance to fully historicise 
social categories and concepts. Julian Go is certainly right that to historicise is not a 
panacea for political and intellectual problems. But in some instances, to provincialize, 
theorise, and historicise can lead to casting off intellectual crutches, no matter how 
invested in them we may be. For it was not by the ‘social concept’ as such that Du Bois 
and Fanon showed that ‘race’ is not a biological truth, but an understanding, among other 
things, of the secular relational constitution of white supremacy. To understand how and 
why such a general understanding advanced under the label of ‘social’ theory requires 
historical and conceptual analysis of the universalizing impulses of capitalism and empire. 
It is simply not enough to fall back on the old methodological canards about social 
thought: the sociology textbook tautology that ‘social’ phenomenon and ‘social’ effects 
exist because they occur between people (Barkawi); the notion that we are always already 
doing social explanation if our claims are not based on nature, ‘Jesus or Allah’ (Go); or 
statements such as ‘the international, the political, and the sociological’ are ‘mutually 
constitutive and hence by definition historically imbricated’ (Jabri, emphasis added). 
Vivienne Jabri is absolutely right that international political sociology is one of the most 
intellectually productive literatures in IR. It was certainly not singled out for criticism. 
Indeed, Economy of Force makes no mention of the Bigo and Walker article to which 
Jabri refers. Nonetheless, many international political sociology practitioners 
inadvertently join social constructivists, the English School, international historical 
sociologists and others in perpetuating ahistorical invocations of ‘the social’ in lieu of an 
actual genealogy of distinctly social forms of practice and thought (Owens, forthcoming).  
To historicise and denaturalise nineteenth-century social and sociological theories 
is obviously not to question the secular relational constitution of the human world; to say 
that trained sociologists never said anything of importance; or to abandon the canon of 
classical social theory. It is to shed new light on the history of social, sociological and 
international thought, for example to retrieve the sozialpolitik origins of political realism 
and the structural functionalism behind liberal solidarism. More importantly, it is to show 
how, with the problematic exception of Marxism, distinctly social theories originally 
emerged to explain and remedy class and anti-colonial revolts. That is, they were modern 
forms of oikonomikos, the science of domestication. Indeed, symptomatic of the 
assimilation of household rule into basic ‘political’ and social concepts, the canonical 
social theorists largely conceived politics as government, as domination, essentially 
violent, about ruling and being ruled. This is exemplified in Weber’s ‘political realism’, 
but also in Marx, Durkheim, and a great deal of IR scholarship. Consider Barkawi’s 
oxymoronic references to ‘household politics’, the words never conjoined in Economy of 
Force, and claim that Vietnamese communists ‘defeated a discourse of the household 
with a politics of the social’. In fact, the National Liberation Front replaced one despotic 
household form with another. Refusing to register the underlying political theory 
questions at stake in the nature of government under counterinsurgency, including the 
possibility of theorising an alternative politics-as-non-domestication, Barkawi cannot see 
the ‘difference’ it makes ‘to re-describe modern society and politics as scaled-up, 
bureaucratically administered households’. But this was also a non-question for Max 
Weber and Clausewitz.  
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Centring analysis on the pervasive but also contingent discourses and practices of 
household administration offers a new basis for theorising politics as the opposite of 
household management, that is, as constituted through resistance to domestication. Thus 
Jabri is absolutely right when she says that despotic household rule ‘does not easily lend 
itself… to the potentiality of the resisting subject’ or ‘enable us to unravel the emergence 
of the subject of politics’. But this is hardly a critique of Economy of Force. It is one of 
its central assumptions. Indeed, the closing pages sketch an alternative political theory of 
non-domestication that is precisely and explicitly not based on the languages and 
practices of the household. For Barkawi, this is just ‘speculation’; for Markell, it is 
theorising that ‘breaks out of the deep argumentative rut in twentieth-century political 
theory’. The experience of biological necessity, Markell writes, ‘is not always already 
identical to the experience of necessity involved in the compulsion of some people by 
others: instead, the equation of these two kinds of necessity is the persistent but 
contingent achievement of discourses and practices of household rule, which exploit the 
former kind of necessity in order to impose the latter kind’. This seemingly simple insight 
has radical implications not only for the history and theory of modern society, which 
naturalises household management, but for theorising a meaningful political alternative. 
Drawing on Marx, Jabri rightly asks whether the category of ‘household’ can 
effectively work at such an abstract level necessary for ‘critique’. This is an important 
question that the book does not thoroughly address. Rather than consider the historical 
conditions in which such an abstract category might be conceived, and why liberalism 
and social theory obscure this, Jabri denies the possibility: ‘the fundamental baseline of 
critique…’, she writes, ‘does not easily lend itself to despotism’. Overlooking the actual 
content of household administration in Economy of Force, including lengthy analyses of 
social work at the level of population, Jabri focuses on a narrow concept of ‘despotism’ 
or ‘rule’, presenting the household as somehow the ‘universal manifestation of rule’, ‘all 
rule’. Household governance is reduced to a ‘repressive model’ because it is obviously 
unable to account for the varieties of power articulated through Foucault’s sovereign-
discipline-biopolitical triptych. But this is a missed opportunity for a more productive 
dialogue on how, why, and with what consequence Foucault’s genealogy of ‘population’ 
conflated ‘household’ with ‘family’, thereby inadvertently supporting liberalism’s 
foundational myth regarding the destruction of household governance in modern ‘society’ 
(34-35, 109-111). To borrow Jabri’s words, the household surely is ‘the condition of 
possibility for such [liberal] rationalities’. The founding apologue of liberalism is 
precisely the disavowal of household rule over self-governing subjects while rationalizing 
its modern manifestations.  
Households are not the universal manifestation of all rule. The concept is limited 
to relations of governance based on the control of life processes, real bodies that need 
food, water, and shelter. Indeed, the constitutive feature necessary for any work of 
conceptual abstraction is precisely the hierarchical administration of life necessities (2-4, 
7-8, 39-41, 88-91). Thus, if one wanted to pursue them, there are several commonalities 
between Marx on abstract labour and theorising the social realm as a distinctly modern 
and universalising form of household. That is, to make sense of the logic of governance 
under capitalist imperial states we require the abstract notion of household: the 
administration of life necessities based on hierarchical relations between household 
members in a particular, though not necessarily fixed, spatial arrangement. Indeed, 
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omitting co-residence and fixed location from the household concept, making co-
residence a contingent rather than a fundamental feature, allows us to examine precisely 
how and why co-residence is present in some contexts, but not others, as Markell 
illuminates through the writings of Aristotle, Marx, and Arendt. The alternative implies a 
radical distinction between states and empires, to re-inscribe the nation-state ontology 
into political theory. This is obviously not to suggest that households explain all ‘the 
complexities of the international’, let alone reduce the wars in Iraq to ‘armed social work’ 
or the ‘ontology of household rule’ (Jabri). 
 Economy of Force now has a life of its own. The book is not perfect and I must 
accept responsibility for its flaws, as well as the generous praise. Reading the four 
commentaries, I have not been fully clear about the basis of the homology between 
different household forms; the relation between social theory and counterinsurgency 
practice; or engaged fully with the postcolonial literatures to which several core 
arguments are indebted. New and productive avenues for further work have also been 
suggested, including on how to theorise the contingencies of co-residence and fixed 
location, on abstraction, and how to better historicise and theorise subaltern agency. Yet, 
for now at least, I remain convinced of the basic claims, that existing literatures are 
inadequate to the task of theorising some of the most persistent forms of 
counterinsurgency governance; that international and political theory needs to do better at 
historicising social and sociological theories against the backdrop of the rise and violent 
transformations of the social realm; that this, in turn, sheds new light on the history of 
international thought; and that in these tasks we could do worse than look again - and 
even fully retrieve - the rich history and theory of household administration.  
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